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Climate Finance

Africa’s adaptation finance must reach healthy farmers on flexible terms

(10 min read)

Three stories from mid November point to one gap. A Businessline analysis argues that the farmer’s body is a primary asset in farm productivity, because untreated pain, health shocks in peak season and medical debt hold output back. Two Down To Earth reports from the COP31 talks in Antalya show developing countries pressing for a just transition mechanism and for a climate finance work programme that moves from dialogue to delivery. A Farmers Weekly report on a Welsh government study, drawn from 63 farmers and eight industry representatives, finds that adaptation stalls when grants and rules ignore the variety of farming systems. For African agriculture the three belong together: climate money, health and flexible delivery decide whether a smallholder can adapt.

The farmer’s body is the first farm asset

Africa’s farms run largely on family labour, so a lost workday is a lost harvest task. The evidence is clearest for malaria. In Côte d’Ivoire, farmers who were sick for more than two days had 47% lower yields and 53% lower revenues than those who missed two days or fewer, a finding reported in a 2019 Malaria Journal study of a Zimbabwean banana farm. In rural Ethiopia, a 50% rise in household malaria prevalence cuts land productivity by about 13 dollars per person a year, equal to 7.8% of annual income per person. In Gaya, Niger, rainy season health costs cut the profitability index of family rice farms from 0.423 to 0.095, because illness removes labour just when demand for it peaks and adds treatment bills at the same time.

Sick farm days cut yields, revenue and profit

Fall in farm results linked to malaria in four African studies. Niger’s 78% and the unit differences between studies are explained in the sources

0%25%50%75%100%Côte d’Ivoire, lower yieldFarmers sick over two days: 47% lower yield47%Côte d’Ivoire, lower revenueFarmers sick over two days: 53% lower revenue53%Niger rice, lower profitabilityRainy season profitability index down from 0.423 to 0.09578%Ethiopia, lower incomeA 50% rise in malaria prevalence cuts income by 7.8%7.8%

This is the Farmers’ Health Capital argument in an African setting. When labour is treated as a uniform input these losses disappear from the books. When the farmer’s health is counted as capital, bed nets, early treatment and insured care become productivity investments, and they belong in agricultural budgets.

Health budgets still lag the promise

African governments pledged in the 2001 Abuja Declaration to give health at least 15% of their budgets. Human Rights Watch found that only Cabo Verde and South Africa met it in 2021 and that the average was 7.4%. The WHO African Region atlas puts the share at 6.3% in 2012 and 7.3% in 2020, and finds that patients paid 35.8% of current health spending out of pocket on average from 2012 to 2020. For a farm household that bill arrives in the rainy season, exactly as the Niger study shows.

Government health budgets stay at half the Abuja promise

Health as a share of African government spending, WHO African Region Health Expenditure Atlas 2023 for 2012 and 2020 and Human Rights Watch for 2021. The half is our arithmetic (7.4 over 15)

0%5%10%15%20%Abuja Declaration target: 15%6.3%20127.3%20207.4%2021Domestic government health spending as a share of government budgets, Africa average
A third of health spending comes from patients’ pockets

Out of pocket payments as a share of current health expenditure in the WHO African Region, average 2012 to 2020. The remainder is our arithmetic

Out of pocket: 35.8%Pooled and other sources: 64.2%35.8%out of pocketPaid directly by patients35.8%Government, insurance and donors, our arithmetic64.2%Regional average of current health expenditure,2012 to 2020

The continent’s new farm agenda points the same way. The Kampala CAADP Declaration, in force from 1 January 2026, seeks 100 billion dollars of public and private investment in agrifood systems by 2035 and at least 10% of annual public spending for them, after no African Union member was found on track for the 2025 Malabo targets. Those goals can be reached only by farmers who are well enough to work them.

Climate finance must reach the farm gate

At COP31 the Climate Finance Work Programme became a formal agenda item. Developing countries led by the Like Minded group want a decision on scope and a workplan that runs to COP33, concrete outcomes on public and concessional finance under Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement, and a clear baseline year for the proposed tripling of adaptation finance. The EU, Britain, Canada, Norway and Switzerland say the Belém decision already settled the mandate and that one year remains. The first draft text, 104 paragraphs long, offers three options for the timeframe.

The size of the shortfall explains the urgency. UNEP’s Adaptation Gap Report 2025 puts developing countries’ adaptation needs at 310 billion dollars a year by 2035 on modelled costs, against 26 billion dollars of international public adaptation finance in 2023, down from 28 billion a year earlier. Debt made up 59% of those flows, a heavy load for countries that also carry health and food import bills. Private adaptation finance is about 5 billion dollars a year and could reach about 50 billion with policy support, still a fraction of the need.

Adaptation needs are about twelve times today’s public flows

Developing countries’ adaptation finance needs by 2035 on modelled costs and international public flows in 2023, UNEP Adaptation Gap Report 2025. The multiple is our arithmetic

0100200300Need: 310 billion dollars310Public flows 2023: 26 billion dollars-26Gap: 284 billion dollars284Needed a year by 2035Public flows in 2023Gap left to fillUS dollars, billions a year. The 284 gap is our arithmetic (310 less 26)
Private money could cover only a sixth of the need

Annual adaptation finance in developing countries, UNEP Adaptation Gap Report 2025. Reaching 50 billion would need targeted policy and blended finance

0100200300Public international flows: 26 billion dollars26Public flows 2023Private flows: 5 billion dollars5Private flows todayRealistic private potential: 50 billion dollars50Private potentialAnnual need by 2035: 310 billion dollars310Need by 2035US dollars, billions a year. Private potential is about 16% of the need, our arithmetic (50 over 310)

Smallholders sit at the back of the queue. The Climate Policy Initiative found that climate finance to small scale agrifood systems fell from 9.85 billion dollars in 2017/18 to 5.53 billion in 2019/20, only 0.8% of tracked climate finance, and that 96% of it was public. Sub Saharan Africa received the largest regional share, 34% or 1.86 billion dollars. A tripling of adaptation finance will help African farmers only if the baseline, the grant share and the delivery channel are agreed.

Climate finance to small farms fell by 44% in two years

Annual climate finance to small scale agrifood systems and its share of all tracked climate finance, Climate Policy Initiative and ClimateShot Investor Coalition, 2023

04812160%0.5%1%1.5%2%2017/18: 9.85 billion dollars$9.85bn2017/182019/20: 5.53 billion dollars$5.53bn2019/201.7%0.8%Climate finance, dollars (left axis)Share of all climate finance (right axis)
Sub Saharan Africa gets the largest slice of a small pot

Regional shares of climate finance to small scale agrifood systems, 2019/20, Climate Policy Initiative. The 39% and 27% are our arithmetic from the 73% reported for three regions

Sub-Saharan Africa: 34%, 1.86 billion dollarsSub-Saharan Africa34%$1.86bnEast Asia and Pacific plus South Asia: 39%East Asia and Pacificand South Asia39%, our arithmeticOther regions: 27%Other regions27%, our arithmeticClimate finance to small-scale agrifood systems, 2019/20, about $5.53 billionShare of the total. Rectangle areas are proportional

Flexible delivery makes a just transition real

The just transition talks supply the second half of the answer. The African Group, G77 and China, Least Developed Countries and Like Minded Developing Countries want a two tier mechanism, with political oversight and technical delivery, backed by technical assistance, capacity building, technology transfer and predictable grant based finance. The EU, Japan and the Environmental Integrity Group prefer to use existing arrangements. India, the African Group and G77 back a three year extension of the work programme beyond 2026. The African Group called food security non negotiable and asked for support to smallholders, fishers and coastal communities, while India and its allies preferred “food production and food security” to “food systems”, and unilateral trade measures remain unresolved.

The Welsh study asks for grants, regulations and advisory services that fit individual farm conditions rather than uniform requirements. Africa’s farming systems are far more varied, from pastoral drylands to irrigated rice, which is why Kenya’s approach is instructive. Under the Financing Locally Led Climate Action programme, ward committees set priorities and county funds pay for them. By the COP29 talks in late 2024, Kshs12.68 billion had reached 45 counties and 1,418 wards; by April 2026 all 47 counties had enacted Climate Change Fund laws; and the programme has supported more than 2,400 projects from about 295 million dollars of funding.

Three actions follow. Finance ministries and funders should ring fence a grant based share of adaptation money for smallholder groups and publish the baseline against which tripling is measured. Health and agriculture ministries should count malaria control, rainy season care cover and insured treatment as farm investments. County governments should let ward committees choose from a menu of measures, so that a pastoralist and a rice grower are not held to the same rule. AgriKonnekt, a digital registry, finance, delivery and monitoring platform for smallholder groups in Kenya, gives these partners the member, plot and repayment records they need to target support and show results.

Climate negotiations move slowly, but a farmer’s season does not. If the tripling of adaptation finance, the Abuja promise on health and ward level control of funds arrive together, a smallholder can stay well enough to farm, afford the right adaptation and decide how it is done. If they arrive separately, the money will pass by the people it was meant to protect.

Sources & notes

SOURCES: Businessline, FAO national farmers health capital index (14 November 2026); Down To Earth, COP31 priorities on Just Transition (14 November 2026); Down To Earth, COP31 developing countries push to turn climate finance commitments into action (14 November 2026); Farmers Weekly, Inflexible farm policies risk hindering climate adaptation (23 October 2026); Welsh Government, Climate Adaptation in Agriculture Study (2026); UNEP, Adaptation Gap Report 2025; Climate Policy Initiative, climate finance to small scale agrifood systems (2023); Down To Earth on the WHO African Region Health Expenditure Atlas 2023; Human Rights Watch, African governments falling short on health funding (2024); Lukwa et al., Malaria Journal 18 (2019); Diiro et al., malaria risk and agricultural productivity in Ethiopia (2022); Mahamadou et al., malaria and family rice farms in Gaya, Niger; WOAH, African Union third CAADP roadmap to 2035; Malabo Montpellier Panel, Kampala Declaration playbook; The Standard, FLLoCA at COP29 (2024); The Standard, Kenya secures World Bank funding (April 2026); Africa Sustainability Matters, FLLoCA expands grassroots climate financing. Differences between sources: UNEP gives needs of 310 to 365 billion dollars and we use the modelled 310; the Climate Policy Initiative figures are annual averages for 2017/18 and 2019/20, and the 1.7% and 0.8% shares are matched to those periods in that order; the 6.3% and 7.3% health shares are WHO African Region averages while the 7.4% for 2021 is Human Rights Watch’s average across African Union members, so the line joins two compilations; the Côte d’Ivoire figures come through a 2019 paper citing an earlier study, the Ethiopia figure is for a 50% rise in household malaria prevalence, and the Niger index is for the rainy season, so the bars compare effects on yield, revenue, income and profitability and not like with like. Our own arithmetic: an adaptation gap of 284 billion dollars (310 less 26), about 12 times current flows; private potential at about 16% of need (50 over 310) and a tenfold rise from today (50 over 5); a 44% fall in small farm climate finance (9.85 to 5.53); 39% for East Asia, Pacific and South Asia (73 less 34) and 27% for other regions (100 less 73); 64.2% of health spending from other sources (100 less 35.8); government health spending at 49% of the Abuja target (7.4 over 15); a 78% fall in Niger rice profitability (0.423 to 0.095).