On Wednesday 24 June 2026 the Consultative Platform on Climate and Health in Africa (CAPCHA) and the Africa Research & Impact Network host a webinar on the role of the private sector in the nexus between climate and health in Africa. The speaker is Dr Amit Thakker of Africa Health Business, and its deck opens with a blunt claim: donors will not finance climate health, so who else will pay, and on what terms? This article is a briefing for that question. It reads the deck line by line, checks its claims against sources published up to the webinar date, and asks what the answer means for a farmer cooperative in Kenya.
It is the fifth in our series. Earlier pieces covered who pays when the rain fails, who gets the capital inside a household, what a cooperative should measure and borrow, and farming through fragility. It connects to AgriKonnekt and to Kilimora’s Gender Lens work.
Read this first. We read all 13 slides of the AHB deck and the webinar poster. We did not attend the webinar and do not report what was said. All other research stops at 24 June 2026; later developments are not included. We read press coverage and summaries, not the full reports behind them, and say so in the tables below. Where numbers differ between sources we show both.
WMO State of the Climate in Africa 2025 (18 June 2026); WHO/World Bank/IRENA; Africa CDC as reported by AP, May 2026
Eight findings
- The pressure is real and rising. The WMO’s report, released on 18 June 2026, counts 13 million people affected by extreme weather in Africa in 2025 and more than 3,000 deaths.
- Health systems are exposed. Half of sub Saharan health facilities have unreliable power, and fewer than 40% of African countries have multi hazard early warning.
- The aid cushion has been cut. Global development assistance for health fell to $39 billion in 2025, down 51% from 2021, and Africa CDC says aid to African health halved from about $26 billion to about $13 billion.
- Domestic money is thin. Only three of 54 African countries are on track to spend 15% of budgets on health, and about 40% spend more on debt than on health.
- Climate finance is not yet a substitute. Climate finance to Africa reached $44 billion in 2021/22, but private money was 18% of it, and the total met 23% of the estimated need.
- The private sector does real things. Solar clinics, solar fridges, drones and local manufacturing exist at scale, but most were launched with donor or public money, and most numbers are the companies’ own.
- Investors fund what they can measure. The deck’s best point is that climate health lacks investment grade evidence, so the first need is data, not capital.
- For farmers, this is already a health issue. Kenya’s 2025 maize and bean output fell 21% to 35% and more than two million people face drought driven hunger and disease.
The pressure: climate is already a health system problem
The deck’s first message is that climate change is a health system problem, not only an environmental one. The newest evidence supports it. The WMO’s State of the Climate in Africa 2025, released on 18 June 2026, counts about 13 million people affected by extreme weather and climate disasters in 2025 and more than 3,000 deaths. Floods were more than half of reported events, with over 200 deaths in Nigeria in May and over 160 in DR Congo in April, and drought affected more than 8.5 million people in East Africa. Fewer than 40% of African countries have multi hazard early warning systems. We read this through press coverage, not the report.
Lancet Countdown 2025 findings as summarised in an opinion piece by a University of Pretoria professor. Global figures; not Africa only
The global heat figures come from the Lancet Countdown 2025 as summarised in an opinion piece by a University of Pretoria professor, so treat them as a summary of a summary. They say heat related deaths are up 63% since the 1990s, that heat cost a record 639 billion potential work hours in 2024, and that Africa is warming at about twice the global average. The same piece reports a 50% rise in water borne disease in parts of Africa. Africa CDC adds that more than half of Africa’s public health emergencies between 2001 and 2021 were climate related.
Health facilities are the weak link. WHO, the World Bank and IRENA estimated in 2023 that close to a billion people in low and lower middle income countries are served by facilities with unreliable or no electricity. In sub Saharan Africa power is unreliable for half of facilities, and 64% of facilities in low and middle income countries need urgent action, such as a new connection or backup. The agencies put the cost of bringing facilities to a minimal standard at about $4.9 billion, and say solar systems are cost effective and quick to install. The deck says 40% of sub Saharan facilities have reliable power; WHO’s wording implies 50%, so the figures differ.
Share of health facilities, per cent. WHO, World Bank and IRENA, Energizing Health, January 2023
For Kilimora: the cooperative’s members are the outdoor workers in these statistics. Bayer’s medical lead in sub Saharan Africa told The Standard on 9 June 2026 that floods, droughts and heatwaves already disrupt antenatal care, family planning and chronic disease management, and that outdoor workers need awareness of heat risk. That is a channel AgriKonnekt could carry, since it already reaches farmers by phone, though health alerts are not part of it today.
The money: donors are leaving, and the gap is large
The deck’s second slide says donor funding is tightening and will not be replaced. The first half is well supported. IHME’s 2025 estimate puts global development assistance for health at $39 billion in 2025, 51% below the 2021 peak of $80 billion and the lowest in 15 years, with a further decline to $36 billion forecast by 2030. The United States made the largest cut, 67%, and sub Saharan Africa faces the largest regional drop, 25% in a year.
Columns: US$ billion (left axis). Line: per cent of the 2021 level (right axis, our arithmetic). IHME Financing Global Health 2025
The African picture is starker in Africa CDC’s own numbers, reported by the Associated Press in May 2026: aid to African health fell from about $26 billion in 2021 to about $13 billion in 2025. Other reports cite a 70% fall since 2021, and the Africa CDC framework says aid could drop by up to 70% over 2021 to 2025, so estimates differ by method. Outbreaks rose in the same period, from 153 in 2022 to 242 in 2024. BusinessDay reports the rise as 41%; the AP figures imply 58%, our arithmetic.
US$ billion a year. Africa CDC figures as reported by the Associated Press, 18 May 2026. The $13B difference is our arithmetic
Health emergencies in Africa, number of outbreaks a year (Africa CDC as reported by AP)
Chatham House describes the effect on the ground: Nigeria lost more than $600 million in US funded health money, over a fifth of its annual health budget, and Botswana had relied on US sources for a third of its HIV response. Gavi remains funded for 2026 to 2030, with a $1.6 billion Gates Foundation pledge, so aid is falling, not vanishing. That is where the deck overstates: its headline says donors will not finance climate health, while its own subject, vaccines and cold chains, still depends on them.
Left: US funded health money Nigeria lost, as a share of its annual health budget. Right: Botswana’s HIV response funded by US sources. Chatham House, October 2025
Domestic money cannot yet fill the hole. In 2001 African countries promised to give health at least 15% of national budgets; the AP reports that only Rwanda, Botswana and Cape Verde are on track. About 40% of African countries spend more on debt service than on health, and debt service takes about 19% of government revenue in sub Saharan Africa. Africa also imports more than 90% of its health commodities. The response is a push for sovereignty: the Africa Health Security and Sovereignty Agenda adopted in February 2026, Ghana’s Accra Reset, health taxes and pooled procurement, and a target of producing 60% of Africa’s vaccines locally by 2040. The AP also notes that US health agreements with nearly two dozen African countries require them to raise their own spending.
Left: African countries on track to give health 15% of the national budget (Abuja, 2001). Right: countries spending more on debt service than on health. AP, May 2026
An Ebola outbreak in Congo and Uganda, announced days before the AP article, showed the stakes. The strain has no approved treatment or vaccine. Africa CDC’s director said funding shortages are as dangerous as the outbreaks themselves.
For Kilimora: an agricultural cooperative is not a health financier, but it feels the same squeeze. Donor money for extension, nutrition and farmer finance is under similar pressure, and the same governments are short of budget. That is the context for the deck’s question of who else will pay.
Is climate finance the answer?
Climate finance is the obvious next source, and the deck lists climate adaptation funds, green bonds and blended finance among six routes. CPI and FSD Africa’s landscape report shows both the growth and the limits. Climate finance to Africa rose 48% from $30 billion in 2019/20 to $44 billion in 2021/22. Private finance doubled to $8 billion, but it is only 18% of the total, the lowest share of any region, and African governments’ own contribution fell from $1.6 billion to $1.0 billion.
US$ billion a year. CPI and FSD Africa, Landscape of Climate Finance in Africa 2024. The 2019/20 private figure is half of $8B (“doubled”), our arithmetic
The $44 billion splits as the chart below shows. CPI reports $4.2 billion of domestic finance, 10% of the total, of which 75% was private. Splitting the rest is our arithmetic, but it shows how little of the money starts in Africa: about $35 billion of the $44 billion is international public finance.
Inner ring: private or public. Outer ring: domestic or international. Our arithmetic from CPI’s totals: $4.2B domestic finance, 75% of it private
The flows meet only 23% of the estimated yearly need to reach Africa’s 2030 goals, and they are concentrated: ten countries received 76% of private climate finance, with half going to South Africa, Egypt and Nigeria. In debt distressed countries debt makes up 36% to 43% of climate finance. The IMF’s 2025 working paper on sub Saharan Africa reaches a similar view, qualitatively: public finance is not enough, a mix of grants, concessional debt and private investment is needed, and the policy and institutional gaps are what hold investment back.
Left: climate finance as a share of the estimated yearly need to meet Africa’s 2030 goals. Right: ten countries’ share of private climate finance. CPI
Health gets a small share of adaptation money. Adelphi’s 2025 analysis of multilateral climate funds concludes that adaptation finance for health is far below what is needed, though its page gives no percentage. A GCA announcement in April 2026 says private sources are only about 5% of climate finance in Tanzania and that Africa needs about $70 billion a year for adaptation by 2030; an older study reported by Engineering News put the need above $100 billion. Health was not among the sectors in that announcement.
It helps to see the numbers side by side. The bubbles below put aid, climate finance, the health gap and the cost of powering clinics on one scale. They are not strictly comparable, since some are one off and some yearly, but the proportions explain the debate.
US$ billion; bubble area is proportional to the amount. Different bases (one off versus yearly; Africa versus all low and middle income countries); for scale only. $11B is our midpoint of the $7B to $15B range
What the private sector actually does
The deck’s fourth slide lists eight things the private sector brings, from capital to supply chain expertise, and a table of six areas where it makes a difference: solar at facilities, climate resilient diagnostics, early warning and remote monitoring, localised manufacturing, cold chain and ESG or blended finance. Its sixth slide gives six African examples. We checked each against public sources. The table lists what we found, and the map shows where the examples operate.
Countries named in the AHB deck and in reports on Zipline. EM = EM-ONE, EG = Enel Green Power, BT = BioNTech Kigali, RH = Rocket Health, ZP = Zipline
| Deck claim (AHB, 24 June 2026) | What we found | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Solar at health facilities: EM-ONE powers over 90 facilities in Nigeria | EM ONE’s project page lists microgrids of 11, 34, 20 and 25 sites between 2015 and 2019, funded mainly by UK and state donors; the 25 include schools. All four summed is 90, our arithmetic | Plausible; early projects were donor funded |
| Enel Green Power solar plus battery at St Luke Hospital, Wolisso, Ethiopia | Not checked beyond the deck | Deck only |
| BioNTech Kigali: first BioNTainer unit in Rwanda, powered by renewable energy | Six BioNTainer units arrived in March 2023; each can make 50 to 100 million doses a year. We did not confirm current output or the power source | Delivery confirmed; operation not |
| Zipline: drone delivery in Rwanda, Ghana, Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire | Reports add Kenya as a fifth country; 1.8M deliveries by November 2025 and over 2M by January 2026; Zipline and US claims on mortality and stockouts are unaudited | Confirmed, with Kenya added |
| Gavi: over 15,300 WHO prequalified off grid units across Africa | Gavi’s 2023 page says more than 66,000 fridges, about 60% solar, in about 50 countries. The two figures cover different things and we could not reconcile them | Cannot reconcile |
| Rocket Health, Uganda: telemedicine, lab pickup, USSD access | Not checked beyond the deck | Deck only |
| 118 million Africans exposed to drought, floods and heat by 2030 (WMO) | We did not reach the original WMO text; WMO’s latest report (June 2026) gives 13 million affected in 2025 | Not verified |
| 5% of GDP lost to climate extremes each year (WMO) | Not found in the WMO coverage we read | Not verified |
| 40% of sub Saharan facilities have reliable power (WHO) | WHO says power is unreliable for half, which would make it 50% reliable. The deck figure is lower | Differs |
| Adaptation finance gap about $70B a year by 2030; Tanzania private about 5% | Both appear in a GCA announcement of April 2026; a 2023 study reported by Engineering News put the need above $100B, so estimates differ | Confirmed; estimates vary |
Three patterns stand out. First, most showcased models began with public or donor money, such as EM ONE’s early projects funded by UK and state sources, and Gavi’s cold chain grants of about $400 million since 2016. The shift the deck calls from aid to trade is therefore a shift in who pays, not an absence of subsidy. Second, almost every impact figure is the company’s or a donor’s own. Third, the examples cluster in a few countries, as the map shows, which mirrors CPI’s finding that ten countries take 76% of private climate finance.
Share of the 66,000 plus fridges installed through Gavi’s CCEOP in about 50 countries, as of June 2023. The 40% is our arithmetic
The Gavi programme is the best documented. Its 2023 page reports more than 66,000 fridges installed in about 50 countries, around 60% solar powered, supported by about $400 million of grants since 2016, and an estimated 7,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide averted a year. An evaluation in three countries found wider immunisation reach and fewer stockouts. The deck’s figure of 15,300 units is different, and we could not reconcile it.
The test case: Zipline and pay for performance
The sharpest example of the new model is Zipline. In November 2025 the US government announced $150 million to expand drone delivery of blood, vaccines and medicines across five African countries on a pay for performance basis: funds are released only after governments sign expansion contracts and commit to long term fees. African governments would pay up to $400 million in service fees. Hospitals and clinics served would triple from 5,000 to 15,000, and nearly 130 million people would gain access. Zipline reports 1.8 million deliveries in Africa by then, and over two million worldwide by January 2026, when it raised more than $600 million at a $7.6 billion valuation.
US announcement of 26 November 2025 as reported by Newscenta; company and government claims, not independently audited
Hospitals and health centres served by Zipline; the addition is the plan, released only after governments sign expansion contracts
The model answers the deck’s question: governments pay, with a donor guarantee. It also raises the next one. The claimed results, up to 56% lower maternal mortality, 60% fewer stockouts and delivery times cut from as long as 13 days to under 30 minutes, are the company’s and the US government’s. The contracts depend on fiscal space in countries where 40% spend more on debt than on health. Whether the fees are affordable is the real test.
For Kilimora: this is the closest parallel to AgriKonnekt’s own design. Kilimora pays farmers on verified practice, within 24 hours of a funder’s release, by its own description. Both models pay on proof, and both put the burden on measurement. The difference is who pays: Zipline’s fees fall on governments, AgriKonnekt’s on climate and sustainability funders. The lesson is that the contract, not the technology, decides whether the model survives a funder’s retreat.
Making it investable: the data problem
The deck’s ninth slide makes its strongest point: climate health financing often lacks investment grade evidence, economic modelling, localised data and return analysis. It asks for cost of illness studies, economic burden assessments, climate attributable disease modelling and investment cases. AHB’s example is a collaboration with BlackFrog Technologies on solar powered vaccine cold chains. The deck cites AHB’s own Kenyan modelling of climate attributable antimicrobial resistance, which we could not find.
Africa CDC’s framework offers a public answer. It sets a five year budget of $482.5 million for 2025 to 2029, with $121.5 million for emergency response and $100 million for health systems, and proposes climate health bonds, solidarity levies and structured public private partnerships, plus an African Health Financing Scorecard for accountability. It puts the annual climate health financing gap at $7 to $15 billion.
US$ million, 2025 to 2029, total $482.5M. “Other pillars” is our arithmetic. Africa CDC framework as reported by Ecofin, January 2026
The mismatch is large. The framework’s budget is about $0.10 billion a year, our arithmetic from the five year total, against a yearly gap of $7 to $15 billion. They measure different things, since the framework is a costed plan for Africa CDC’s priorities, but the comparison shows why leaders talk about mobilising private capital.
US$ billion a year. Africa CDC’s $482.5M over five years is about $0.10B a year (our arithmetic). The two measure different things; compared for scale only
The deck’s six financing routes each need something specific to work. The table sets out what, and the question a cooperative, a funder or a government should ask.
| Financing route in the deck | What it needs to work | Question to ask |
|---|---|---|
| Blended finance (DFI, government, private) | A public funder willing to absorb first losses | Who carries the first loss, and for how long? |
| ESG financing | Corporate climate health commitments that are measured | Is it additional, or relabelled spending? |
| Green bonds | A borrower with a revenue stream and a creditworthy guarantor | Who repays if the project underdelivers? Debt is 36% to 43% of climate finance in distressed countries |
| Outcome based financing | Agreed outcomes, independent verification, a payer with fiscal space | Governments would pay up to $400M for Zipline: is that fundable where 40% of countries spend more on debt than health? |
| Climate adaptation funds | Health counted inside adaptation plans | Adelphi finds current adaptation finance for health far below need |
| PPP models | Clear contracts, local ownership, a regulator | Who owns the data and the equipment at the end? |
Where agriculture meets health
Climate health is usually discussed through clinics and vaccines, but for a farming household it starts in the field. Kenya’s State of the Climate report for 2025, released in March 2026, ranks 2025 as the country’s seventh warmest year in 36, with warming of about 0.22°C a decade since 1991. Western Kenya’s flash floods killed at least 88 people. The forecast for June to December 2026 gives a 58% to 61% chance of El Niño. At least KES 57.31 billion was needed for February to July 2026.
State of the Climate Kenya 2025 (released 23 March 2026), as reported by Down To Earth
The effect on food was large. Maize and bean output fell 21% to 35%, maize stocks 37% and tomatoes 39%, while sorghum rose 49%. Cholera and visceral leishmaniasis spread. A separate report on the October to December 2025 rains says more than two million Kenyans face worsening hunger and disease, ten counties are in drought, and tens of thousands of children and pregnant women are at high risk of acute malnutrition.
Output change as reported by Down To Earth from the Kenya Meteorological Department report. The bar for maize and beans is drawn at the larger end of the reported −21% to −35%
Kenya has acted on the infrastructure side: in December 2023 the Ministry of Health said it planned to put solar panels on all public hospitals by 2028, supported by 100,000 community health promoters. The article gives no cost, count or funder, and we do not know progress.
For Kilimora: three links stand out. First, nutrition: the cooperative’s work to keep farmers producing through drought is a health intervention, whether or not it is labelled one. Second, women: Bayer’s medical lead stressed that women need continued access to antenatal care and family planning during floods and displacement, which fits Gender Lens’s focus on women’s individual access. Third, chemicals: AgriKonnekt promotes organic inputs, which could reduce farmers’ exposure to agrochemicals. That benefit is plausible but unmeasured, and we do not claim it.
The table below translates the deck’s four building blocks to the farm. Two are outside AgriKonnekt’s current scope, and we say so.
| Deck’s building block | Farm level equivalent | Status at Kilimora |
|---|---|---|
| Resilient infrastructure | Flood safe stores, drying and collection points | Not part of AgriKonnekt as we know it |
| Renewable energy | Solar for pumps, cold storage and phone charging | Not part of AgriKonnekt as we know it |
| Green supply chains | Organic inputs sourced near the farm, fewer chemicals handled | Offered; health benefit plausible but not measured |
| Digital health | USSD advice and early warning alerts, including heat and flood warnings | USSD and field sensors exist; health alerts not offered |
Growth multiples implied by AgriKonnekt’s own stated numbers. Targets, not results
The scale AgriKonnekt plans, from 1,500 farmers in six counties to 50,000 in three countries by 2030, makes the deck’s data point practical. Every multiple is a multiple of what must be measured. The deck says investors fund what they can measure, and the same is true of climate finance for farmers, which is why the verification design is the product, not a cost.
What we would ask for
- Name the payer and the price. Every private sector example should say who pays, how much and on what terms: grant, fee or loan.
- Report with denominators. Facilities served, uptime and outcomes, not only totals, and reconcile figures such as the 15,300 and 66,000 fridges.
- Separate pilots from sustained models. Say which examples would survive without the donor that launched them.
- Generate local evidence. Fund cost of illness and, for farmers, cost of lost harvest studies in Kenya and other countries.
- Reach primary care and rural sites. WHO finds they are far less likely to have power than urban hospitals.
- Prefer grants and results payments to loans where countries are debt distressed, since debt already makes up 36% to 43% of their climate finance.
- Carry early warning to the last mile. With fewer than 40% of countries covered, phone based alerts to farmers and clinics are a practical gap to fill.
- Count women and outdoor workers explicitly in every climate health indicator.
Questions worth asking on the day
- The deck says donors will not finance climate health. Gavi is funded to 2030 and the US is backing Zipline. Which donors are leaving, and which are changing the terms?
- Which of the six African examples has become profitable without a donor, and how long did that take?
- Zipline’s model needs governments to pay fees. Which governments can, and which will need a guarantee?
- What would count as investment grade evidence for a climate health project, and who should produce it?
- Domestic budgets are thin and debt service is high. Is private finance realistic where a fifth of revenue goes to interest?
- How do we stop the first mover countries taking all the private money, as ten countries do now?
- What role can farmers’ organisations play in climate health, beyond being beneficiaries?
- How should outcomes be verified in places auditors cannot reach?
What we can and cannot claim
| Statement | Evidence status |
|---|---|
| 13 million people affected and over 3,000 deaths from extreme weather in Africa in 2025 | WMO, as reported by two Kenyan outlets; we did not read the WMO report itself |
| Aid to African health fell from about $26B (2021) to about $13B (2025) | Africa CDC via the Associated Press; other sources say a 70% fall, and IHME’s global figure is down 51% |
| Outbreaks rose from 153 (2022) to 242 (2024) | Africa CDC via AP; BusinessDay reports a 41% rise, while 153 to 242 is 58% (our arithmetic) |
| Private climate finance to Africa doubled to $8B but is 18% of the total | CPI and FSD Africa, 2021/22 data; newer data may exist |
| Solar power at clinics is cheaper and quicker than grid extension | WHO calls it cost effective and quick; it gives no per clinic costs in the text we read |
| Zipline cut maternal mortality up to 56% and stockouts 60% | Company and US claims; not independently audited |
| AHB’s case: private capital will fill the gap donors leave | A thesis; the evidence we found shows aid falling by half, not private money replacing it |
| AgriKonnekt’s pay on verification model suits climate health finance | Our argument; not tested in health |
The deck’s own sources
The deck ends with 11 references. The table shows how far we could check each one.
| Source listed in the deck | Status |
|---|---|
| Africa CDC, Climate Change and Health Strategic Framework, 2025 | Read through Ecofin coverage (27 January 2026) |
| Lancet Countdown on Health and Climate Change in Africa, 2025 | Read through a summary opinion piece only |
| WHO AFRO and AECF, Innovative financing for climate resilient health systems, 2025 | Not read |
| WMO, State of the Climate in Africa 2023 | Not read; we used the 2025 edition via press coverage |
| WHO, World Bank and IRENA, Energizing Health, 2023 | Read through WHO’s news release |
| IFC, Building Climate Resilient Health Systems | Not read |
| World Bank, IFC and MIGA, DARES, 2022 | Not read |
| CPI and FSD Africa, Landscape of Climate Finance in Africa, 2024 | Read through CPI’s press release |
| Global Center on Adaptation, Climate Adaptation Investment Markets in Africa, 2026 | Read through an April 2026 announcement only |
| UNDP, Unlocking Africa’s Climate Action Potential: The Private Sector’s Role, 2024 | Not read |
| IMF Working Paper 2025/099, Laying the Ground for Scaling up Climate Finance in Sub Saharan Africa | Abstract read; no figures on the page |
SOURCES: AHB deck, The Role of the Private Sector in the Nexus between Climate and Health in Africa (CAPCHA Spotlight Series, 24 June 2026), and webinar poster; Africa Health Business; WMO State of the Climate in Africa 2025 as reported by Generation Radio and Eastleigh Voice; WHO, World Bank and IRENA, Energizing Health; University of Pretoria opinion on Lancet Countdown; IHME, Financing Global Health 2025; Associated Press on health sovereignty, 18 May 2026; BusinessDay on Africa’s domestic health financing; Chatham House, Africa after USAID; CPI and FSD Africa, Climate Finance in Africa 2024; IMF Working Paper 2025/099; Adelphi on adaptation and health finance; GCA announcement on adaptation investment markets, April 2026; Engineering News on Africa’s adaptation needs (headline only); Ecofin on the Africa CDC climate health framework; EM-ONE project page; Gavi VaccinesWork on solar fridges; TechMoran on Zipline; Newscenta on the US Zipline commitment; Southern African Times on BioNTech Kigali; Down To Earth on Kenya’s 2025 climate; The Standard on climate shocks and Kenya’s health system; DevelopmentAid on drought in Kenya; The Standard on solar in public hospitals; DevelopmentAid on OECD aid data; Kilimora, AgriKonnekt, Gender Lens Programming, Closing the verification gap, Who pays when the rain fails?.
Differences between sources: sub Saharan facilities with reliable power are 40% in the deck, while WHO’s wording implies 50%; aid to African health fell 50% per Africa CDC via AP and 70% per other reports; outbreaks rose 58% by the AP figures and 41% per BusinessDay; the deck cites 15,300 Gavi units while Gavi’s 2023 page cites 66,000; adaptation need is $70B a year in the GCA announcement and above $100B in a 2023 study; Zipline operates in four countries per the deck and five per press reports.
Our own arithmetic: the share of the 2021 aid level; the $13B fall in African health aid; the split of the $44B into private, public, domestic and international; the 2019/20 private figure of about $4B; the 77% gap; the 51 countries not on track and other complements in doughnuts; the $261M “other pillars”; the framework’s $0.10B a year; the $11B midpoint; the 40% of fridges not solar; the Zipline addition of 10,000; Nigeria and Botswana shares drawn at 21% and 33%.
Not read: the full WMO, Lancet Countdown, CPI, GCA, IMF, Africa CDC and WHO reports; the webinar itself; the Rocket Health and Enel material beyond the deck. Company claims (Zipline, AHB, EM-ONE, Gavi) are as stated by them. Kilimora statements about its systems and targets are the company’s own and are not independently audited.